Epistemic systems are social processes generating judgments of truth and falsity. I outline a mathematical theory of epistemic systems that applies widely. Areas of application include pure science, torture, police forensics, espionage, auditing, clinical medical testing, democratic procedure, and the market economy. I examine torture and police forensics in relative detail. This paper is an exercise in comparative institutional epistemics, which considers how the institutions of an epistemic system influence its performance as measured by such things as error rates and (...) the volume of judgments generated. (shrink)

The American criminal justice system creates incentives for false conviction. For example, many public crime labs are funded in part per conviction. We show that the number of false convictions per year in the American criminal justice system should be considered ?high.? We examine the incentives of police, forensic scientists, prosecutors, and public defenders in the U.S. Police, prosecutors, and forensic scientists often have an incentive to garner convictions with little incentive to convict the right person. These incentives create what (...) economists call a ?multitask problem? that seems to be resulting in a needlessly high rate of false convictions. Public defenders lack the resources and incentives needed to provide a vigorous defense for their clients. Corrective measures are discussed, along with a call for more research. (shrink)

Forensic science error rates are needlessly high. Applying the perspective of veritistic social epistemology to forensic science could produce new institutional designs that would lower forensic error rates. We make such an application through experiments in the laboratory with human subjects. Redundancy is the key to error prevention, discovery, and elimination. In the “monopoly epistemics” characterizing forensics today, one privileged actor is asked to identify the truth. In “democratic epistemics,” several independent parties are asked. In an experiment contrasting them, democratic (...) epistemics reduced the rate at which biased observers obscured the truth by two-thirds. These results highlight, first, the potential of “epistemic systems design,” which employs the techniques of economic systems design to address issues of veracity rather than efficiency, and second, the value of “experimental epistemology,” which employs experimental techniques in the study of science. (shrink)

L’activité entrepreneuriale génère l’activité entrepreneuriale. Cet article développe cette idée dans une perspective autrichienne. Nous envisageons les entrepreneurs kirznériens sous l’angle de l’apprentissage hayékien. L’activité entrepreneuriale développe l’activité entrepreneuriale de deux manières. Premièrement, la mise en oeuvre d’une nouvelle tentative crée de nouvelles opportunités pour d’autres nouvelles tentatives. Deuxièmement, chaque acte entrepreneurial kirznérien est un exemple incitant les autres à faire de même. Nous mettons l’accent sur le second point. Chaque nouvelle tentative entrepreneuriale modifie les perceptions des autres quant à (...) l’émergence des opportunités, aux gens qui peuvent les saisir, etc. Elle rend les gens plus vigilants. Ainsi, l’action entrepreneuriale crée des externalités positives. Ces externalités expliquent que des communautés, par ailleurs identiques, donnent lieu à des niveaux différents de tentatives entrepreneuriales.Entrepreneurship breeds entrepreneurship. This insight is developed within the context of Austrian economics. We view Kirznerian entrepreneurs as Hayekian learners. Entrepreneurship breeds entrepreneurship two ways. First, the founding of a new venture creates new opportunities for other new ventures. Second, each act of Kirznerian entrepreneurship is a favorable example for others to follow. We concentrate on the second point. Each act of newventure entrepreneurship changes the perceptions of others about how new ventures are founded, what sort of person might do it, and so on. It makes people more alert. Thus, entrepreneurship creates a network externality. This externality explains the fact that otherwise similar communities produce dissimilar levels of new-venture entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Israel Kirzner’s concept of “alertness” is recast in the language of phenomenological psychology. Our ideas about things are either openended ideas posing no particular problem of choice, “open possibilities”, or alternatives to choose between, “problematic possibilities”. Choice is the process of formulating problematic possibilities; it is the process of reinterpreting one’s situation. The fully formed reinterpretation generates the chosen outcome as a necessary consequence of preferences and perceived constraints. Reinterpretation precedes choice, both logically and temporally. This understanding of alertness helps (...) to clarify Austrian ideas such as the idea that preferences do not exist apart from action.Le concept de “vigilance” d’Israel Kirzner est reformulé dans le langage de la psychologie phéno- ménologique. Nos idées à propos des choses sont souvent des idées à finalité ouverte ne soulevant pas de problème particulier de choix, “des possibilités ouvertes”, ou des alternatives de choix entre des “possibilités problématiques”. Le choix est un processus de formulation de possibilités problématiques ; c’est le processus consistant à réinterpréter nos propres situations. Dans sa formulation ultime, la réinterprétation génère le résultat choisi comme conséquence nécessaire des préférences et des contraintes perçues. La réinterprétation précède le choix, et logiquement et temporellement. Cette compréhension de la vigilance aide à clarifier les idées Autrichiennes telle que l’idée selon laquelle les préférences n’existent pas indépendamment de l’action. (shrink)

L’activité entrepreneuriale génère l’activité entrepreneuriale. Cet article développe cette idée dans une perspective autrichienne. Nous envisageons les entrepreneurs kirznériens sous l’angle de l’apprentissage hayékien. L’activité entrepreneuriale développe l’activité entrepreneuriale de deux manières. Premièrement, la mise en oeuvre d’une nouvelle tentative crée de nouvelles opportunités pour d’autres nouvelles tentatives. Deuxièmement, chaque acte entrepreneurial kirznérien est un exemple incitant les autres à faire de même. Nous mettons l’accent sur le second point. Chaque nouvelle tentative entrepreneuriale modifie les perceptions des autres quant à (...) l’émergence des opportunités, aux gens qui peuvent les saisir, etc. Elle rend les gens plus vigilants. Ainsi, l’action entrepreneuriale crée des externalités positives. Ces externalités expliquent que des communautés, par ailleurs identiques, donnent lieu à des niveaux différents de tentatives entrepreneuriales.Entrepreneurship breeds entrepreneurship. This insight is developed within the context of Austrian economics. We view Kirznerian entrepreneurs as Hayekian learners. Entrepreneurship breeds entrepreneurship two ways. First, the founding of a new venture creates new opportunities for other new ventures. Second, each act of Kirznerian entrepreneurship is a favorable example for others to follow. We concentrate on the second point. Each act of newventure entrepreneurship changes the perceptions of others about how new ventures are founded, what sort of person might do it, and so on. It makes people more alert. Thus, entrepreneurship creates a network externality. This externality explains the fact that otherwise similar communities produce dissimilar levels of new-venture entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Degrees of belief; Dempster's rule of combination; Simple and separable support functions; The weights of evidence; Compatible frames of discernment; Support functions; The discernment of evidence; Quasi support functions; Consonance; Statistical evidence; The dual nature of probable reasoning.

When we are fatigued, we feel that our performance is worse than when we are fresh. Yet, for over 100 years, researchers have been unable to identify an objective, behavioral measure that covaries with the subjective experience of fatigue. Previous work suggests that the metrics of signal detection theory —response bias and perceptual certainty —may change as a function of fatigue, but no work has yet been done to examine whether these metrics covary with fatigue. Here, we investigated cognitive fatigue (...) using SDT. We induced fatigue through repetitive performance of the n-back working memory task, while functional magnetic resonance imaging data was acquired. We also assessed cognitive fatigue at intervals throughout. This enabled us to assess not only whether criterion and d’ covary with cognitive fatigue but also whether similar patterns of brain activation underlie cognitive fatigue and SDT measures. Our results show that both criterion and d’ were correlated with changes in cognitive fatigue: as fatigue increased, subjects became more conservative in their response bias and their perceptual certainty declined. Furthermore, activation in the striatum of the basal ganglia was also related to cognitive fatigue, criterion, and d’. These results suggest that SDT measures represent an objective measure of cognitive fatigue. Additionally, the overlap and difference in the fMRI results between cognitive fatigue and SDT measures indicate that these measures are related while also separate. In sum, we show the relevance of SDT measures in the understanding of fatigue, thus providing researchers with a new set of tools with which to better understand the nature and consequences of cognitive fatigue. (shrink)

Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic prompted people and institutions to turn to online virtual environments for a wide variety of social gatherings. In this perspectives article, we draw upon our previous work and interviews with Ghanaian Christian leaders to consider implications of this shift. Specifically, we propose that the shift from physical to virtual interactions mimics and amplifies the neoliberal individualist experience of abstraction from place associated with Eurocentric modernity. On the positive side, the shift from physical to virtual environments (...) liberates people to selectively pursue the most fulfilling interactions, free from constraints of physical distance. On the negative side, the move from physical to virtual space necessitates a shift from material care and tangible engagement with the local community to the psychologization of care and pursuit of emotional intimacy in relations of one’s choosing—a dynamic that further marginalizes people who are already on the margins. The disruptions of the pandemic provide an opportunity to re-set social relations, to design ways of being that better promote sustainable collective well-being rather than fleeting personal fulfillment. (shrink)

I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. On this model the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of two cues: i) smoothness of action: done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action and ii) action outcome: done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation of the (...) feeling of agency. However, within the literature there is a growing sense of unease with the model; a consensus seems to be building that the model is not up to the task of explaining all of the new discoveries made regarding the feeling of agency since its inception. Most problematically there are paradigms which deeply challenge the comparator model by suggesting that a weak feeling of agency can be elicited even when no motor prediction is formed. The new account offered here inherits the explanatory power of the comparator model whilst avoiding this problem. (shrink)

Introduction. The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those suffering certain psychotic symptoms are thought to have a deficient sense of agency. Here I seek to explain this sense of agency in terms of metacognition. Method. I start with the proposal that the sense of agency is elicited by metacognitive monitoring representations that are used in the intentional inhibition of thoughts. I apply this model to verbal hallucinations and the like and (...) examine the plausibility of this model explaining deficits associated with these symptoms. Results. By tying the sense of agency to metacognitive inhibition I propose that the loss of a sense of agency in certain psychotic symptoms is accompanied by a particular deficit in the patient’s ability to control their own thinking. This is consistent with the experiences of those at high risk of developing hallucinations, who report more intrusive thoughts than controls. The model I present is able to explain why those at risk of developing verbal hallucinations and those suffering from verbal hallucinations have deficits in the intentional inhibition of thought. I defend this account from a possible objection by distinguishing the form of the intentional inhibition deficit displayed by those suffering verbal hallucination from that displayed by those suffering from orbital-frontal cortex lesions and posttraumatic stress disorder. Conclusion. A plausible hypothesis is that the sense of agency over thoughts is elicited by the metacognitive monitoring representation used to intentionally inhibit. (shrink)

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the experience of touch coming from that artificial body part. An explanation of this illusion would take significant steps towards explaining the experience of embodiment in one’s own body. I present a new cognitive model to explain the RHI. I argue that the sense of embodiment arises when an on-line representation of the candidate body part is represented as matching an (...) off-line prototype representation of what one’s body is usually like. The cause of the sense of embodiment in the model body part only partially overlaps with the causes of proprioceptive drift, which commonly accompanies the RHI, and so is compatible with observed dissociations between the illusion and proprioceptive drift. The distinguishing features of this model are the off-line body representation, and the process of matching an on-line model to an off-line model, both of which are to be understood in terms of a conceptual space. -/- Key Words: Rubber Hand Illusion; RHI; Sense of Embodiment; Self Consciousness; Body Experience. (shrink)

Confidentiality of health information is increasingly relevant in the era of electronic medical records. We discuss the case of a hospitalized patient who requested a neurology consultation for an episode he described as an “LSD-like” flashback. The patient expressed concern that the episode was a residual effect of past drug use, but subsequently requested that his drug use not be documented. Involved in a custody battle, he feared that if his records were released to the court he could lose custody (...) of his children. Ethical concerns arose with regards to the physician’s competing obligations with a duty to record information accurately and honestly, respect patient autonomy, and maintain patient confidentiality. We discuss the decision of the team to document the patient’s drug use by arguing that the obligation to maintain confidentiality did not supersede the primary role of the medical record as a complete and accurate account, which cannot be altered at a patient’s behest. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories have largely been framed by the academy as a stigmatised form of knowledge. Yet recent scholarship has included calls to take conspiracy theories more seriously as an area of study with a desire to judge them on their own merits rather than an a priori dismissal of them as a class of explanation. This paper argues that the debates within the philosophy of religion, long overlooked by scholars of conspiracy theories, can help sow the seeds for re-examining our (...) understanding of conspiracy theories in a more balanced and nuanced way. The nature of religious belief is elemental to understanding the epistemological foundations of the conspiracy theorising worldview amidst what we may call ‘conspiratorial ambiguity’. Specifically, R.M. Hare's concept of bliks, which are unfalsifiable but meaningful worldviews, offers a way forward to reframe our approach towards the theory of conspiracy theories. (shrink)

An account of the conflict between our positive and negative emotional relationships to the Earth and how they will be resolved for the Symbiocene, the next period in the history of the Earth.

I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator (...) model needs case-by-case adjustment to deal with problematic data. In response to this, the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete, it is more naturally constrained by the cases that are problematic for the comparator model. However, this model may be untestable. I conclude that currently the comparator model approach has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model approach. (shrink)

Maynard Adams (1919¿2003) was a profound philosopher and civic humanist at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

In this paper, I defend a pluralistic view of phenomenological method which will provide evidence for particular accounts of experience without relying exclusively on the reflective method or on intuition as a criterion for truth. To this end, I discuss the prospects for indirect phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology ought to be defined by its object of investigation, first-person experience, and not by any particular method of gaining access to this object of investigation. On this view, an integration of naturalized (...) phenomenology into the cognitive sciences is far more feasible than we might have expected. (shrink)

The advance of the internet and social media has had a drastic impact on our epistemic environment. This paper will focus on two different risks epistemic agents face online: being exposed to fake news and epistemic flooding. While the first risk is widely known and has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature, the notion of ‘epistemic flooding’ is a novel concept introduced in this paper. Epistemic flooding occurs when epistemic agents find themselves in epistemic environments in which they are (...) routinely confronted with more information and evidence than they can diligently process. Epistemic flooding is one of the most significant risks epistemic agents run while using social media and one of the reasons why the first risk (being exposed to fake news) is especially pernicious. It is particularly harmful if one ascribes to the Spinozan model of belief acquisition in which belief comes easy. Mitigating the combined threat of fake news and epistemic flooding requires us to think normatively about our epistemic environments and how to better them. This paper turns to the normative framework of epistemic environmentalism in order to accomplish this. (shrink)

Argues that the only way to understand the Confucian vision of the consummate moral life is to take the tradition on its own terms.

This article examines the argument that biodiversity is crucial for well-functioning ecosystems and that such ecosystems provide important goods and services to our human societies, in short the ecosystem services argument (ESA). While the ESA can be a powerful argument for nature preservation, we argue that its dominant functionalist interpretation is confronted with three significant problems. First, the ESA seems unable to preserve the nature it claims to preserve. Second, the ESA cannot explain why those caring about nature want to (...) preserve it. Third, the ESA might undermine its own goal because it potentially decreases environmental motivations. (shrink)

This paper argues for two theses: that degrees of belief are context sensitive; that outright belief is belief to degree 1. The latter thesis is rejected quickly in most discussions of the relationship between credence and belief, but the former thesis undermines the usual reasons for doing so. Furthermore, identifying belief with credence 1 allows nice solutions to a number of problems for the most widely-held view of the relationship between credence and belief, the threshold view. I provide a sketch (...) of a formal framework on which both theses are true. This is a modified Bayesian framework; I argue that despite making credences context-sensitive, the framework lets Bayesians hold on to their signature explanatory successes. The sort of context-sensitivity claimed for credences here mirrors the sort of context-sensitivity I have elsewhere claimed for outright belief: one's credences depend, in part, on the space of alternative possibilities one takes seriously in a context. (shrink)

Glenn Alexander Magee's controversial book argues that Hegel was decisively influenced by the Hermetic tradition, a body of thought with roots in Greco-Roman ...

How have we come by our worldviews, and what influence did Christianity have on those that are common to Western civilization?

The earliest Analects yet discovered, this work provides us with a new perspective on the central canonical text that has defined Chinese culture--and clearly illuminates the spirit and values of Confucius.

The sense of agency over bodily actions is the feeling that one is the agent of one's actions. In this paper I examine the prospects of Frith and colleagues' influential comparator account of how the sense of agency over one's bodily actions is elicited, in comparison to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues in response to some problems with this account. I examine two problems for the comparator model. I consider the common objection that the actual sensory (...) consequences of action aren't needed to elicit the sense of agency with a look at the data which most strongly suggests this, namely the preserved sense of agency over phantom limb movements. I consider a problem for the comparator model in the behaviour of normal subjects placed in unusual circumstances, in particular I consider the 'wheel of fortune' studies which some take to be problematic for the comparator model. I argue that neither of these objections are devastating for the comparator model and that the comparator model plus some plausible assumptions can explain these data. However, these assumptions are not part of the original comparator model. In the end we get a version of the comparator model modified to deal with problematic cases in a manner that could be seen as somewhat ad hoc. To deal with this the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete a single version can be offered which is naturally constrained by the cases which are problematic for the comparator model. However, it is not clear what, if anything, could count as evidence against the multifactorial weighting model. Despite being generated with the data in mind it may be untestable. I conclude that currently the comparator model has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model. (shrink)

In this paper, I reinterpret the conflict between rewilders and those who want to preserve traditional agricultural landscapes. By showing that underlying both positions is a common outlook in which nature preservation can be described as a primarily interpretative act geared towards the preservation of meaning by establishing a successful contact with external reality, I hope to refocus the debate away from the current stalemate. Too often, the debate ends in a dispute about what counts as 'real nature'. By interpreting (...) nature preservation - whether it is directed at rewilding or at preserving old agricultural landscapes - as an act that is a response to nature's meanings, we will refocus attention on the real issue underlying preservation: articulating the ways nature is meaningful to us. (shrink)